The Bank for International Settlements is escalating its message on stablecoins from consumer-risk framing to systemic-risk plumbing. In Tokyo, BIS general manager Pablo Hernández de Cos warned that large US dollar stablecoins could create “material consequences” for financial stability and economic policy if they grow large enough to rival traditional money.
At a Bank of Japan seminar in Tokyo on April 20, BIS general manager Pablo Hernández de Cos called for tighter global coordination on stablecoin regulation. He warned that US dollar-denominated stablecoins could have “material consequences” for financial stability and economic policy if they grow large enough to rival traditional money.
De Cos positioned the issue as more than a crypto-market microstory. The BIS, an institution that supports central banks and publishes financial stability research, is treating stablecoins as a cross-border payments and funding-market question that can spill into traditional balance sheets.
He also argued that today’s stablecoin arrangements still fall short of what is required for a widely used means of payment, even while they enable faster cross-border transfers and integration with smart contracts.
De Cos singled out USDt (USDT) and USDC (USDC) as examples of large USD stablecoins that resemble investment products more than cash-like money. The mechanics he pointed to were primary-market redemption fees and conditions, plus “episodes” where secondary-market prices diverged from par.
That distinction matters for market structure. A stablecoin that trades like an instrument with access frictions can behave less like a pure payment token and more like an exchange-traded wrapper, where the peg is maintained through arbitrage that may not be frictionless under stress.
De Cos said these features make the tokens behave more like ETFs. At the same time, he argued they still carry run and contagion risks because issuers hold short-term government debt and bank deposits as reserve assets.
The BIS framing focused on the second-order effects of redemptions, not just the optics of a de-peg. In a stress episode, De Cos warned, rapid outflows could force sales of reserve assets into already strained markets or transmit funding pressure to banks.
That channel runs through liquidity transformation, where redeemable liabilities are backed by assets that can become less liquid in a rush. The European Central Bank has drawn a related comparison between euro stablecoins and tokenized money market funds, noting both face run risk but operate under different transparency, liquidity management, and regulatory regimes that shape how stress transmits into funding markets.
De Cos also flagged compliance perimeter risk. He said public, permissionless blockchains and unhosted wallets place a significant share of stablecoin activity outside conventional AML/CFT controls, increasing illicit-use risk unless bespoke safeguards are implemented at on- and off-ramps. The size of that “significant share” was not quantified.
Europe is already testing the boundary of stablecoin payments sovereignty. Earlier in April, Bank of France First Deputy Governor Denis Beau urged the EU to go beyond the original MiCA text by limiting non-euro stablecoins in everyday payments and tightening rules around issuing the same coin inside versus outside the bloc to reduce regulatory arbitrage during stress.
The UK is moving on a parallel track. In March 2026, members of the House of Lords questioned Coinbase on whether stablecoins could drain commercial bank deposits, trigger Silicon Valley Bank-style runs, and facilitate crime as the government finalizes a bespoke regime for fiat-backed tokens.
Traders should also watch for any BIS or central-bank guidance that puts numbers on the narrative, including thresholds for when stablecoins “rival traditional money” and details on the referenced de-peg “episodes.” On the alternative-rails side, regulated-bank pilots are a live signal. UBS and several Swiss peers launched a franc stablecoin pilot in a sandbox on April 8 to explore blockchain-based franc payments inside a regulated framework.
I read the BIS message as an attempt to reclassify the mental model: USDT and USDC are being treated less like neutral payment cash and more like investment-like instruments with redemption frictions and market-price behavior that can gap under stress. That reframing strengthens the case for harmonized cross-border rules, because it shifts the debate from consumer protection to systemic plumbing.
The threshold that matters is whether policymakers translate the run-risk channel into tighter on- and off-ramp requirements rather than headline bans. If limits on non-domestic stablecoin payments, stricter inside-versus-outside issuance rules, and bespoke AML/CFT safeguards start landing in the EU and UK, the setup starts to look structural rather than narrative-driven, with real consequences for how dollar liquidity moves across exchanges and permissionless rails.

Pablo Hernández de Cos urged tighter cross-border stablecoin rules as dollar tokens scale toward systemic relevance.