China’s Supreme People’s Court to study adjudication rules for “virtual currency” cases
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China’s Supreme People’s Court to study adjudication rules for “virtual currency” cases

The court also flagged cross-border finance disputes and promised civil-compensation interpretations for insider trading and manipulation.

By AI News Crypto Editorial Team4 min read

China’s Supreme People’s Court said it will study adjudication rules for “virtual currencies” and cross-border finance cases as it seeks more consistent handling of digital-economy disputes. The initiative lands while mainland China’s blanket ban on crypto transactions remains in force, keeping the policy line restrictive even as courts prepare more standardized guidance.

Key Takeaways

  • China’s top court put “virtual currency” and cross-border finance disputes on its research agenda as part of a broader push to clarify digital-economy adjudication.
  • A senior Judicial Committee member said judicial interpretations for civil compensation tied to insider trading and market manipulation will be formulated “as soon as possible.”
  • The same work program includes judicial protection rules for AI and data property rights, spanning data ownership, data transactions, and AI-generated content.
  • The 2021 multi-agency blanket ban on crypto transactions, mining, and ICO-related activity remains in place, alongside earlier restrictions dating back to 2013.

China’s Top Court Puts “Virtual Currency” Disputes on Its Rulemaking Agenda

China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) said it will study adjudication rules for “virtual currencies” and cross-border finance cases, framing the effort as part of clarifying how courts handle digital-economy disputes.

At a press conference held on a Wednesday near the May 27, 2026 publication, SPC Judicial Committee member Liu Guixiang described the direction in explicit terms: “We will conduct in-depth research on the adjudication rules for new cases such as virtual currencies and cross-border finance, formulate judicial interpretations on civil compensation involving insider trading and market manipulation as soon as possible,” Liu said.

For market participants, the signal is less about permissiveness and more about process. The SPC is telegraphing that crypto-linked disputes are showing up often enough, and with enough complexity, that lower courts need a tighter playbook, especially where cross-border elements can complicate jurisdiction, evidence, and enforcement.

AI and Data Property Rights: Ownership, Transactions, and AI-Generated Content

In parallel, the SPC said it will study judicial protection rules for artificial intelligence cases and data property rights. The court named three buckets of disputes: data ownership, data transactions, and AI-generated content.

That pairing matters. It suggests the court is building a broader digital-economy judicial toolkit where “virtual currency” is treated as one subset of a wider category that also includes data as an asset and AI outputs as a source of rights and liabilities. For traders, the practical implication is that China’s legal system is investing in standardization around digital-era disputes, not carving out a special lane that implies crypto normalization.

How This Fits With China’s Standing Crypto Transaction Ban

Mainland China’s blanket ban on crypto transactions remains in place. The September 2021 action by ten agencies covered all crypto transactions, Bitcoin mining, and activities tied to initial coin offerings (ICOs).

The restrictive posture predates that. In December 2013, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) banned financial institutions from offering Bitcoin-related services and stated Bitcoin was not recognized as a currency.

The source also describes a PBOC move in “February” banning issuance of unauthorized offshore yuan-pegged stablecoins and unapproved tokenized real-world asset (RWA) issuance, though the year is not specified. The same context points to continued state preference for the digital yuan, including approval for commercial banks to share interest with clients holding the CBDC.

Net, the court’s rulemaking agenda reads as standardizing outcomes under a standing ban, not walking the ban back.

Civil Compensation for Insider Trading and Manipulation: A Separate Track to Watch

Liu’s promise to formulate judicial interpretations on civil compensation involving insider trading and market manipulation “as soon as possible” points to a near-term focus on liability and damages frameworks.

That matters even without any change to what is permitted to trade. Clearer civil-compensation standards can alter litigation risk, settlement dynamics, and the expected cost of misconduct allegations. It can also shape how victims pursue restitution in crypto-linked fraud cases, a theme underscored by the article’s reference to Chen Zhi, the Chinese-born founder and chairman of Cambodia’s Prince Group.

Chen was arrested in Cambodia on Jan. 6, 2026 and extradited to China shortly after, where he faces charges related to operating “pig butchering” scam compounds. The US Department of Justice seized about $15 billion worth of Bitcoin in October 2025 from suspected operations tied to Chen, per the case summary.

Traders’ Read: Standardizing Court Outcomes Without Signaling Legalization

The threshold that matters is whether the SPC publishes judicial interpretations that define scope and terms for “virtual currency” disputes and cross-border finance cases, rather than leaving this as a research headline. If definitions, effective dates, and jurisdictional handling show up in black and white, the setup starts to look structural rather than narrative-driven.

I also read the “as soon as possible” civil-compensation track as the sharper near-term catalyst. If courts get a clearer damages framework for insider trading and manipulation, that can change expected liability even in markets where the policy stance stays restrictive. This only becomes tradable information when new interpretations start getting cited in real cases, especially high-profile fraud and restitution disputes with offshore touchpoints.

Sources